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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
Amici curiae are national and international disability and
medical-human rights organizations (more fully described in
Appendix A) with particular interest in the field of mental
retardation. A number of these organizations have appeared
as amici curiae in this Court in cases involving mental retardation and the criminal justice system, including Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (Penry), and Penry v. Johnson, No. 00-6677 (Penry II).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The American people first became aware of the issue
of mental retardation and the death penalty around the time
of this Court’s decision in Penry. In the intervening years,
all available forms of evidence demonstrate an unmistakable
national consensus that people with mental retardation should
not be executed.
Petitioner, as well as other supporting amici, will present this Court with the compelling clinical, moral, and constitutional reasons why such executions violate the Eighth
Amendment. Amici American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR) et al. offer a somewhat different perspective.
Since the Court’s evaluation of whether a national consensus
exists is essentially an evidentiary question, this brief will
provide detailed information concerning the emergence of
that consensus over the last decade and a half.
The evidence is clear. It shows virtually no support
for executing people with mental retardation among legislators, either State or Federal. It shows almost no prosecutors
1

This brief was written entirely by counsel for amici, as listed on the
cover, and not by counsel for any party. No outside contributions were
made to the preparation or submission of this brief. Blanket consent to
amici by the parties has been received by the Court.
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or judges willing to state that they believe individuals with
mental retardation should receive the death penalty. It shows
governors exercising their clemency powers to prevent execution when they come to understand that a defendant has
mental retardation. And in an extraordinary array of public
opinion surveys, spread across the country, taken by different
organizations over a substantial span of time, it shows overwhelming opposition among the American people to the execution of any person who has mental retardation. A clear
majority of those Americans who support the death penalty
oppose its use for defendants who have mental retardation.
The principal reason for this remarkable level of
agreement is our shared moral judgment as a Nation that individuals with mental retardation do not have the requisite
level of culpability to warrant execution. This moral sentiment has been expressed by legislators and others in various
ways, but the clarity of the message is unmistakable.
Opposition to the execution of people with mental
retardation has been reinforced by awareness of the fact that
a defendant’s disability increases the likelihood that a factually innocent defendant may be executed. The specter of
such an intolerable injustice has strengthened the resolve of a
Nation that already opposed capital punishment for these defendants on moral grounds.
This Court has applied the Punishments Clause of the
Eighth Amendment sparingly. Where, as here, there is no
identifiable support for a punishment in the country, but the
system proves itself incapable of reflecting the national consensus, the Court should prohibit the practice as the cruel and
unusual punishment that it is.
ARGUMENT
I. THERE IS A CLEAR AND UNMISTAKABLE NATIONAL CONSENSUS AGAINST THE IMPOSI-
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TION OF THE DEATH PENALTY ON PERSONS
WITH MENTAL RETARDATION.
The American people oppose executing individuals with
mental retardation. The emergence of this consensus, while
distinctive in its political manifestations, is fully consistent
with this Court’s teachings about the Punishments Clause of
the Eighth Amendment.
The Punishments Clause prohibits not only those penalties that were unacceptable at common law, but also those
that offend contemporary standards. By interpreting the
Eighth Amendment in this fashion, the Court assures that its
protections are not limited to practices that were deemed barbarous in the eighteenth century, Stanford v. Kentucky, 492
U.S. 361, 369 (1989), but are also reflective of the “evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (opinion of
Warren, C.J.).
The Court has not exercised this function of monitoring
and reflecting the evolution of societal values lightly. Judicially imposed limitations derived from the Punishments
Clause are the exception to the general rule that issues of
criminal sanctions are normally determined by legislative
bodies. But the Eighth Amendment’s function has never
been limited to merely ratifying legislative judgments.
Rather, it is to assure that a national consensus about punishment, where one exists, is reflected in judicial sentencing.
Pursuant to this Eighth Amendment mandate, the Court
has been particularly careful not to identify a national consensus under circumstances where the evidence of the public’s sentiment is ambiguous or potentially untrustworthy.
Thus in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 334 (1989), the
majority declined to ground an Eighth Amendment holding
on then-existing evidence of a national consensus against the
execution of people with mental retardation that included
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only two enactments by state legislatures.2 Likewise, in
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), a majority refused to approve the execution of defendants younger than 16
years old in the face of ambiguity about how many States
tolerated the practice, or had directly considered the issue.
See Id. at 851 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
A principal component of that exercise of caution has
been the focus on legislative enactments around the country.
The Court has placed emphasis on such enactments as “an
objective indicator of contemporary values upon which we
can rely.” Penry, 492 U.S. at 335. The Court has frequently
adverted to the pattern of relevant statutes in determining
whether a national consensus exists. See, e.g., Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion by White,
J.); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). The focus on enacted legislation has been explained as deriving both from general principles of Federalism and from the Eighth Amendment’s textual
reference to the characteristic of a prohibited punishment as
“unusual.” Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369-70.
But the Court has never indicated that state laws were the
consensus. Rather, it has emphasized that such laws constitute important evidence relevant to the question of whether
such a consensus exists.
This distinction is crucial. The consensus envisioned by
the Eighth Amendment is a consensus of the American people, not a consensus of the States.3 The States and their leg-

2

When the Court announced its judgment, it identified Georgia as the
only State that had enacted such a statutory prohibition. During the pendancy of the case, Maryland enacted a statute, and the Court’s opinion
was modified to reflect laws in both States.
3

Thus, analysis of the weight to give States that have rejected the death
penalty altogether, see generally Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370 n. 2, must turn
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islators are proxies, by which the shared judgment of the
American people becomes manifest.
The Court’s explanation for its reliance on the enactments
of legislatures is consistent with this analysis. Statutes provide “objective evidence of the country’s present judgment
concerning the acceptability” of punishment in a particular
circumstance. Coker, 433 U.S. at 593. The Court has described legislative activity as “the clearest and most reliable
objective evidence of contemporary values,” Penry, 492 U.S.
at 331, and “an objective indicator …upon which we can
rely.” Id. at 335. The attributes of legislation that commend
it to the Court as a measuring device for public opinion are
the political accountability of the legislators who are charged
with the task of reflecting and codifying public sentiment,
and their “considered judgment,” Thompson, 487 U.S. at 852
(O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Thus, the process as much as the product gives legislation its unique value
for Eighth Amendment purposes. How legislative bodies
have considered and approached the issue of the potential
execution of people with mental retardation is as illuminating
of the national consensus as the number of States that have
enacted statutes.
Issues implicating the Punishments Clause arise in different procedural and political contexts. For example, some issues, such as the adoption of a novel method of execution,
arise only when a legislature affirmatively addresses them de
novo. See generally In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
Other questions, like the continued acceptability of an old
method of execution, can arise either from a legislature’s
conscious choice to retain it or from legislative inattention.
See generally Provenzano v. Moore, 744 So.2d 413, 418

on their evidentiary value in the issue of national sentiment, rather than
simply excluding their citizens from that evaluation.
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(Fla. 1999) (Harding, C.J., specially concurring), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1255 (2000).
Similarly, the reasons for a legislature’s action or inaction
may vary, even on the same issue. For example, a State that
abandoned the electric chair because the people were disturbed by reports of an execution that resulted in protracted
pain to the condemned inmate might be viewed differently
from a facially identical statute in another State that abandoned it because a different means of execution was less expensive. These and other contextual differences appropriately influence the Court’s interpretation both of legislative
enactments and of the absence of enactments in other legislatures.
This Court has never suggested that its evaluation of
statutory enactments involved mere arithmetical calculation.
In the vernacular, the Court’s function is not a simple matter
of “bean-counting.” 4 Rather, it is a cautious and sober judicial exercise of ascertaining the Nation’s sentiment on moral
questions of the utmost gravity. As such, it cannot be reduced to a simplistic mechanical formula.
Claims for a national consensus must be evaluated on the
basis of the available evidence, and that evaluation has been
undertaken cautiously. The Court’s wariness concerning
such claims reflects both its deference to the judgments of
legislative bodies, and a concern to avoid mistaking a transitory or ephemeral sentiment for a true national consensus.
See generally Thompson, 487 U.S. at 854-55 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
4

The fact that the Court serves as more than just a tally sheet for state
laws is reflected in the fact that the degree of unanimity among the States
sufficient to satisfy the Punishment Clause’s requirements has not been
reduced to a simple number. Compare Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,
789 (1982) with Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 (1977).
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There is a strong and unmistakable consensus in the
United States today against executing individuals with mental retardation. This brief presents the evidence that both reveals and confirms that national agreement. In doing so,
amici will explore the distinctive features of the development
and manifestations of this particular consensus.
A. The American People Only Became Aware Of
Mental Retardation As A Death Penalty Issue In
Recent Years.
Certain issues involving capital punishment are obvious
to any legislature contemplating the enactment of a death
penalty statute, while others are not. For example, it is clear
that any State adopting the penalty will know that it must
specify the crimes for which the penalty may be imposed and
select a method of execution. Somewhat less obvious would
be whether it is necessary for the legislature to set a minimum age below which the penalty cannot be imposed. With
regard to the potential execution of very young persons, a
legislature might not envision that a jury would impose such
a sentence, but, on the other hand, the issue might be within
legislators’ anticipation because it was a topic that other
States had addressed. And in recent years, the topic of age
was more likely to have come to legislators’ attention because of this Court’s rulings in Thompson and Stanford.
The relevance of mental retardation to the death penalty
was not a matter of public or legislative awareness or concern
prior to fifteen years ago and, as a result, it was difficult to
speak of a national consensus on the issue at that time. No
legislative body had addressed the question. There were
virtually no public debates on the topic.5 Professional and
5

The only earlier examples were editorials a year earlier involving Morris Mason. See, e.g., Editorial, St. Paul Pioneer Press-Dispatch, July 5,
1985.
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disability advocacy organizations had
the topic. The matter was not on the
the national or state level, until the
Georgia surrounding the imminent
Bowden in 1986.

taken no positions on
radar screen, at either
dispute that arose in
execution of Jerome

Bowden was identified as having mental retardation
when he was 14 years old.6 Following protests against his
impending execution, the Board of Pardons and Paroles
granted a stay of his execution.7 Bowden was then evaluated
by a single psychologist selected by the state Board of Pardons and Paroles.8 Despite the fact that the testing produced
an IQ within the range of mental retardation, the Board of
Pardons and Paroles lifted the stay of execution. Jerome
Bowden was executed the following day.9
The dispute engendered by the Bowden case in Georgia
began to enter the national consciousness shortly thereafter.
The American Association on Mental Retardation, the nation’s oldest and largest professional organization in the field
of mental retardation, formulated and adopted a position in
January, 1988. The Arc, the largest volunteer and advocacy
organization in the field, adopted a position statement in the
same year. The American Bar Association adopted a position statement opposing the death penalty for individuals
with mental retardation in February, 1989. When Congress
reinstated the Federal death penalty in 1988, it included a
provision barring the execution of any individual with mental
retardation, and, in 1989, Maryland became only the second
state to legislate on the topic. Therefore, it was not surpris6

Dan Baum, Parole Board Grants Stay of Execution, Tests for Bowden,
Atlanta Const., June 18, 1986, at A10.
7
Bill Montgomery, Bowden’s Execution Stirs Protest, Atlanta Journal,
Oct. 13, 1986, at A1.
8
Jim Galloway and Tracy Thompson, Bowden Executed Day After
‘Mildly Retarded’ Ruling, Atlanta Const., June 25, 1986, at A1.
9
Id.
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ing that when this Court considered Penry in the 1988 Term,
it discovered only a modest amount of legislative activity on
the subject.10
B. The National Consensus Against Executing Individuals With Mental Retardation Is Now Revealed
In Legislative Enactments
Each State’s legislative process has its own unique features, but the commonalities of how the mental retardation
death penalty statutes were enacted provide important insights into the relationship between the consideration of these
laws and public sentiment. Amici offer these observations to
assist the Court’s interpretation of the degree of consensus on
this subject.
On many topics, the legislature’s consideration of concrete proposals is preceded by efforts by interest groups to
influence public opinion in the hopes of then mobilizing that
10

As the Penry decision noted, a number of other statutes made defendants’ mental status potentially mitigating. 492 U.S. at 337 n.3. But,
with one exception, these statutes do not give evidence of the legislature’s
consciousness of mental retardation as an issue in capital cases. A number of States recognized defendants acting under “extreme mental or
emotional disturbance,” e.g., Laws of April 8, 1977, ch. 338, § 4, 1977
Mont. Laws 1041, 1043 (current version at MONT. C ODE ANN. § 46-18304 (b) (1992)), or defendants who “because of a mental disease or defect, lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of conduct
or to conform to the requirements of law,” e.g. Laws of July 1, 1981, S.B.
No. 1 §1-2929.04(B)(3), 1981 Ohio Laws 1, 16 (current version at OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B)(3) (Anderson, 1996 & Supp. 1998). In
each instance, these statutes merely recited provisions from the Model
Penal Code, § 210(4)(b) and (g), which, in turn, reflected factors related
to the defense of insanity but insufficient to warrant acquittal. The exception occurred in 1987 when the Maryland legislature, after the Bowden case, modified “mental disease or defect” to the explicit “mental disorder or mental retardation.” Laws of May 14, 1987, ch. 418, S.B. 973,
1987, Md. Laws 2107 (current version at MD. A NN. C ODE OF 1957, Art.
27, § 75A (a)(2) (Michie 1996)).
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sentiment to influence legislators. On other subjects, no such
public relations effort is undertaken and the process begins
with the legislature’s consideration of a proposed bill. Alan
Rosenthal, The Third House: Lobbyists and Lobbying in the
States 171-77 (2d ed. 2001).
In none of the States where mental retardation death penalty legislation has been considered was there a public information effort preceding the introduction of the bill. Public
opinion polling had indicated such strong and consistent
agreement with the proposition, that it was clear that none
was needed.11 The “public sentiment” expressed in polls and
resolutions, which the Court noted in Penry, 492 U.S. at 335,
was readily apparent at the state level.12

11

Appendix B contains a review of all polls known to amici that have
been taken on this subject, both at the state and national levels.
This Court has declined to base an Eighth Amendment hol ding on
the results of public opinion polling, particularly if it has not led to substantial codification. Penry, 492 U.S. at 335. This caution is understandable, given that measurement of opinions may be transitory and the results of polling may be influenced by the sampling techniques employed
or the phraseology of the questions. But this does not mean that professional public opinion surveys are factually irrelevant to the question of
whether a consensus exists on a particular punishment. For example, if a
substantial number of States outlawed a practice, but consistent public
opinion polling indicated widespread indifference on the subject, it might
undermine the presumption that the enactments reflected strong public
sentiment. By contrast, where scientific polling by a wide variety of political scientists and other professional surveyors, employing a range of
formulations of the issue and surveying a number of jurisdictions over a
substantial period of time, produce uniform results, it is surely relevant to
any inquiry about public sentiment. The results included in Appendix B
are remarkably consistent over time, geography, and particulars of polling
techniques.
12

For example, Maryland’s legislation was preceded by polling that
indicated that 82% of its citizens opposed the death penalty for persons
with mental retardation. See Appendix B.

-23-

Only two States had addressed the topic by 1989. Following the Penry decision, however, interest among legislators and disability advocates increased dramatically. Kentucky and Tennessee enacted statutes the following year. In
the decade following this Court’s decision, there was an average of one new State enactment per year.13 In 2001, so far,
five more legislatures—Arizona, Florida, Texas, Missouri,
and Connecticut—have passed laws protecting these individuals from the death penalty.14 Amici know of no other
topic on which so many legislatures have acted to limit any
criminal penalty in such a short time.15
As a result, the proposition that people with mental retardation should not face the death penalty met with widespread
acceptance among legislators. The only real opposition to
the proposed legislation came from some prosecutors, but
their argument was almost never to oppose the general prin13

When Congress expanded the Federal death penalty in 1994, it again
included a provision that prohibited any individual with mental retardation from being sentenced to death or executed. Federal Death Penalty
Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 3596 (c) (1994).
14

In Texas, as of this writing, both houses of the legislature have passed
a bill prohibiting the execution of defendants with mental retardation.
The bill has not yet been signed by Governor Perry, whose spokesperson
stated that the Governor believed that “this issue should wait until the
United States Supreme Court rules in the Penry case and a similar North
Carolina case.” Armando Villafranca, Historic Execution Bill Passes;
Mentally Retarded to Get Protection, Houston Chron., May 27, 2001, at
A1. Governor Perry has since stated, “[o]ne of the clear messages I’m
not sure is getting out of our state is that we do not execute the mentally
retarded in Texas.” Janet Elliott, Governor Accused of Ducking Moral
Issue; Perry Says State Doesn’t Execute Retarded, Houston Chron., June
1, 2001, at A31.
15

By comparison, since this Court’s decision in Stanford, decided the
same day as Penry, only one state legislature has raised the threshold age
for the death penalty. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-102 (1999).
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ciple. Rather, the objection most frequently heard by legislators, and echoed by some, was not that people with mental
retardation were appropriate subjects for the death penalty,
but rather that legislation was not needed in that particular
State to prevent such executions. In State after State, a frequent objection to the proposed law was that it was unnecessary because prosecutors would never seek the death penalty
for an individual whom they viewed as having mental retardation. 16
Secondary concerns in the legislative process involved
practical considerations about the proposed law’s implementation. Legislators sought assurances that the definition
specified in the bill would encompass only people who actually had mental retardation, as it is commonly understood.17
In response to that concern, all the States adopted, almost
without variation, the AAMR definition of mental retardation
to which this Court adverted in Penry.18 Lawmakers were

16

“No mentally retarded person ever has been executed in Colorado, said
Representative Pat Sullivan, R-Greeley, who contended the measure was
unnecessary.” Steve Lipsher, House OKs Ban on Execution of Mentally
Retarded Murderers, Denver Post, Apr. 6, 1993, at 4B; “‘We haven’t
executed any mentally retarded people in Nebraska—nobody’s showed
me we have—so whatever we’re doing, it’s working,’ said Sen. Kate
Witek of Omaha.” Robynn Tysver, Ban of Executions of Retarded Passes
First Round, Omaha World-Herald, Apr. 7, 1998, at News 17.
17

“‘I think members of the Texas Legislature and the citizens of Texas
agree that we should not execute the mentally retarded,’ said Sen. Todd
Staples, R-Palestine. ‘But I do believe there is a legitimate difference on
how we measure that and how we gauge a person’s mental culpable
state.’” Kathryn A. Wolfe, Senate OKs Death Penalty Bill; Would Ban
Execution of Mentally Retarded, Houston Chron., May 16, 2001, at A1.
18

“Persons who are mentally retarded are described as having ‘significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently
with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the developmental period,” 492 U.S. at 308 n. 1, quoting American Association on
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already familiar with this definition; they had employed it in
numerous statutes outside the criminal justice system in a
wide range of contexts. Indeed, the same definition is found
in statutes enacted in most States. See Appendix C. Additionally, legislators frequently inquired about the diagnostic
process, and sought assurances that legislation would not
create contentious “battles of the experts.” As this Court has
concluded, diagnosis of mental retardation does not involve

Mental Deficiency (now Retardation) (AAMR), Classification in Mental
Retardation 1 (H. Grossman ed. 1983).
AAMR has since reformulated the definition for clinical dia
gnostic
purposes, modifying the language somewhat in ways that do not alter the
scope of coverage of statutes involving people with mental retardation:
Mental retardation refers to substantial limitations in present functioning. It is characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual
functioning, existing concurrently with related limitations in two
or more of the following applicable adaptive skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social skills, community use, selfdirection, health and safety, functional academics, leisure, and
work. Mental retardation manifests before age 18.
AAMR, Mental Retardation: Definition, Classification, and Systems of
Supports 5 (9th ed. 1992); accord American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed. text revision
2000). No substantive change in scope resulted from the greater specificity in requiring onset by the age of 18 rather than during the developmental period (which had been interpreted as age 18 in some States and
21 in some others). Similarly, the increased specificity of “limitations in
adaptive skill areas” simply made more concrete the concept of “deficits
in adaptive behavior.” The other principal change in AAMR’s new classification manual is the abandonment of the previously recognized taxonomy within mental retardation of subcategories of “mild,” “moderate,”
“severe,” and “profound” mental retardation. AAMR, Mental Retardation: Definition, Classification, and Systems of Supports 34 (9th ed.
1992); James W. Ellis, Decisions By and For People with Mental Retardation: Balancing Considerations of Autonomy and Protection, 37 Vill.
L. Rev. 1779, 1781-82, 1784 n.10 (1992).
Missouri is the only State whose statute is based on the 1992 version
of the AAMR definition; all other States employ the 1983 version.
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the kind of subjective clinical judgments that are frequently
encountered in litigation involving mental illness.19
Finally, legislators sought reassurance that the statute
they were considering would not be vulnerable to unmeritorious claims based on feigned disability or malingering.
Several solicited expert testimony in legislative committees
on the likelihood of malingering mental retardation. See
generally Brief of Amici Curiae American Association on
Mental Retardation et al., Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348
(1996) (No. 95-5207) at 17-18.20 As a result of these con19

“[M]ental retardation is easier to diagnose than is mental illness. That
general proposition should cause little surprise, for mental retardation is a
developmental disability that becomes apparent before adulthood. By the
time the person reaches 18 years of age the documentation and other evidence of the condition have been accumulated for years.” Heller v. Doe,
509 U.S. 312, 321-22 (1993) (citations omitted).
20

“Rep. Matt Boatright, a Sedalia Republican, said [about Missouri legislation] he was concerned that new classes of defendants would argue
they were mentally retarded to escape execution.” Tim Hoover, Bill on
Capital Punishment Advances to Senate, Kansas City Star, Mar. 9, 2001,
at B2. Compare “Backers of the [Washington State] bill disagreed, saying
that mental retardation is virtually impossible to fake and that without the
law, a retarded person could be executed if the crime were heinous
enough.” Disabled Kept Off Death Row, Seattle Times, Apr. 19, 1993, at
B4.
When the United States Senate discussed an omnibus crime bill in
1990, Senators Joseph Biden and Alan Simpson debated the potential for
malingering mental retardation. Senator Simpson stated, “As the language currently stands, the most heinous, devious, clever and deceptive
butchers on death row will be able to fake mental retardation to avoid the
only penalty which is appropriate for their acts of butchery.” 136 Cong.
Rec. S6873 (May 23, 1990) (Senator Simpson). Senator Biden responded, “[F]aking mental retardation is a lifetime’s work…You do not
fake mental retardation. You either are or you are not.” 136 Cong. Rec.
S6881 (May 23, 1990) (Senator Biden). The Senate voted to retain the
mental retardation protection, although the bill to which that provision
was attached did not pass. 136 Cong. Rec. S6910, (May 24, 1990).
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cerns, all the States have chosen to place the burden of persuasion on the issue of mental retardation on the defendant,
cf. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 455 (1992)
(O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment), and a few did so
by an elevated evidentiary standard.21 Some of the States
also provided that the statute would only have prospective
effect, but generally that accompanied a shared belief that no
one under sentence of death at that time met the definition.
Thus the retroactivity issue did not involve a choice to preserve the State’s opportunity to execute anyone with mental
retardation then on death row, but rather a concern not to invite unmeritorious postconviction challenges from current
inmates for whom there had been no previous indication of
mental retardation.22
The breadth and depth of the national consensus against
executing individuals with mental retardation is evidenced by
the consistency of enactments in different States,23 and by the
level of agreement in individual legislatures.24
21

See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-9-4 (b) (1998).

22

For example, New Mexico adopted a prospective-only provision in
1991 with the understanding that the one individual then under sentence
of death did not have any colorable claim to have mental retardation. By
comparison, Nebraska in 1999 adopted a bill with no limitation on retrospective effect, and it was anticipated that two inmates might have such a
claim, which proved to be correct. Angie Brunkow, Clarence Victor No
Longer Faces Death Penalty, Omaha World-Herald, June 30, 1999, at
News 1.
23

Other differences among the statutes are primarily a matter of adapting the bills to the contours of criminal procedures in the individual
States. (The only State in which this produced dramatically different
procedures was Georgia, which grafted the mental retardation provision
onto its existing “guilty but mentally ill” statute.) States also differed in
whether they included an IQ score in the text of the legislation. But these
apparent differences only addressed evidentiary presumptions, not the
scope of the definition of mental retardation. Compare ARK. C ODE ANN.
§ 5-4-618 (1993) (Intelligence quotient test score of 65 or below creates
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C.

States That Do Not Have Mental Retardation
Statutes Do Not Undercut The Evidence Of The
National Consensus.

The States that have enacted mental retardation statutes
provide a remarkably consistent portrait of the consensus
among their citizens on this subject. But there are also a substantial number of jurisdictions that have the death penalty
but have not legislated in the area of mental retardation. It
might be contended that the non-enacting States acquiesced
in the execution of individuals with mental retardation, or
were indifferent to the possibility.
However, evidence from those States that have not yet
enacted a mental retardation provision is fully consistent with
the consensus found in the States that have passed such statutes. The Court has previously been confronted with the dilemma of how to interpret state silence on the execution of
young teenagers in Thompson. Here, the reasons for inaction

rebuttable presumption of mental retardation) with S.D. C ODIFIED LAWS
§ 23A-27A-26.2 (2000 Supp.) (Intelligence quotient test score above 70
is presumptive evidence that a defendant does not have mental retardation). The only other issue of major contention in a few States has been
whether the determination of mental retardation should occur prior to the
trial or following the verdict. Most States have opted for a pretrial determination, the more economical approach. Florida has recently chosen to
make the determination after the trial, acquiescing in prosecutors’ arguments that they should be able to death-qualify potential jurors. The
Texas legislature recently approved somewhat similar procedures, albeit
with opportunities to present the issue both to the jury and in a post-trial
bench hearing. H.B. 236, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2001).
24

Indeed, legislators have voted overwhelmingly in favor of provisions
barring the execution of persons with mental retardation. See Appendix
D.
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by States have been somewhat different, but the evidence
about their motivation is considerably clearer.25
Legislators in some of these States explicitly stated that
they were persuaded that the potential for execution of an
individual with mental retardation was not a practical problem in their State because prosecutors offered assurances that
such a penalty would not be sought. For example, in Oregon,
Clatsop County District Attorney Josh Marquis argued
against a bill banning the execution of defendants with mental retardation: “[T]hat’s a moot issue in Oregon because no
prosecutor in the state has ever sought the execution of a
mentally retarded person.” Brad Cain, Ban on Executing
Retarded People Considered, McMinnville (Ore.) News
Register, Apr. 17, 2001 (internet edition).26 In other instances, legislators were persuaded by prosecutorial assurances that since the State’s law prohibited trying individuals
who were incompetent to stand trial, cf. Dusky v. United
25

Discussion will focus on States that have given serious consideration
to a mental retardation proposal. In a few other States, there have been
no proposals, or perhaps a single legislator may have introduced a bill,
but it was not pursued vigorously and did not receive serious attention in
committees or on the floor of legislative bodies. These perfunctory introductions, which are commonplace in legislative bodies, reveal little about
either legislative or public sentiment in those States.
Particular legal and political considerations also play a part in the
decision about whether to pursue legislation seriously in a particular
State. For example, California, a State with among the most favorable
polling numbers in the nation, see Appendix B, presents a peculiar situation in that any amendment to its death penalty statute requires ratification in a statewide referendum, an exceedingly costly enterprise. In other
States, such as New Hampshire, the legislative focus has been on retention of the death penalty itself rather than its scope.
26

“ ‘We don’t execute mentally retarded people,’ [Harris County District
Attorney Chuck] Rosenthal said.” Mike Tolson, A Deadly Distinction:
Part IV; Death Penalty Reforms Sought; Life Without Parole Has Chance
to Pass in this Legislature, Houston Chron., Feb. 7, 2001, at A1.
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States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960), and provided an insanity defense, an adequate safety net already existed that would assure that no one with mental retardation would ever face the
potential of capital sentencing.27 Whether these assurances
were true or not is not relevant in this case. What matters
here is that the legislators accepting these arguments were
not supporting the execution of individuals with mental retardation.
Even States that did not have the death penalty when
Penry was decided, but which have given it serious legislative consideration in the years since Penry, provide evidence
of the breadth of the consensus on this issue. In Iowa, Minnesota, and Massachusetts, major legislative efforts were undertaken to adopt the death penalty. Each failed to win final
approval, but it is noteworthy that each proposal had included
a provision protecting people with mental retardation from
capital sentencing.28 (This is consistent with the fact that
both of the States that have enacted the death penalty since
Penry, Kansas and New York, have included mental retardation provisions in those statutes.) Taken together, these proposals indicate that legislators viewed protection of people
with mental retardation as an essential part of an acceptable
modern proposal regarding the death penalty.
27

“District attorneys said [North Carolina] state law already requires
judges and juries to consider defendants’ mental competence and mental
problems in murder trials.” Matthew Eisley, Retarded Convicts at Core
of Debate on Death Penalty, News and Observer (Raleigh, N. C.), Apr.
12, 2001, at A3; “But Sen. Walter Dudycz (R-Chicago), a Chicago police
detective and an assistant majority leader questioned the merits of the bill.
‘They can’t be sentenced to death if they don’t possess the mental capacity to understand the crime.…That’s how the judicial system works. To
try to circumvent it doesn’t make sense.’” Teresa Puente and Christi Parsons, House Approves Limits on Death Penalty: Bill Bans Capital Punishment for Mentally Retarded, Chi. Trib., Mar. 3, 2000, at Metro Chicago 1.
28

H.F. 2, 76th Gen. Assem. (Iowa 1995); H.F. 4136, 81st Leg. Sess.
(Minn. 2000); S.B. 1983, 1997 Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1997).
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This concerted legislative activity confirms the mounting
evidence in public opinion surveys and other indicators that
the American people oppose the execution of persons with
mental retardation. It is not a new consensus; rather, it is
abundant evidence of a consensus that has existed ever since
the possibility of executing individuals with mental retardation first manifested itself roughly at the time of the Penry
litigation. It is “public sentiment…find[ing] expression” in
“objective indicator[s] of contemporary values.” Penry, 492
U.S. at 335.29
29

Legislation, of course, is not the only possible evidence of agreement
on a principle. Other indicators also reflect the consensus. Missouri Governor Mel Carnahan issued a commutation for death row inmate Bobby
Lewis Shaw on the basis of his mental retardation in 1993. Gov. Mel
Carnahan, Statement from the Governor on Johnny Wilson, Sept. 29,
1995, cited in Wilson v. Lawrence County, 154 F.3d 757, 759 (8th Cir.
1998). See also At End of Term, Ohio Governor Commutes Death Sentences for Eight, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1991, § 1, at 12; Bill Miller, DNA
Test Could Lead to Man’s Release: Death Row Inmate May Be Innocent
of ’82 Murder, Va. Officials Say, Wash. Post, Oct. 26, 1993, at A1.
Other governors have indicated they would grant clemency in mental
retardation cases. “‘I would never sign a death warrant for an individual
who is mentally retarded.’ [Florida Governor Jeb] Bush said.” Orlando
Sentinel, March 30, 2001 at C3.
In addition, while actions by individual prosecutors and by juries
are difficult to quantify with precision, anecdotal evidence from around
the country suggests that prosecutors often refrain from seeking the death
penalty once a defendant’s mental retardation has been ascertained. Evidence of mental retardation was not presented at the sentencing hearing
of Arizona defendant Luis Mata, causing the prosecutor to comment,
“Quite frankly, after reviewing these materials, I am shocked and upset
that this information had not been presented.…Had I known this information, I would not have requested or pursued a death sentence.” E.J.
Montini, The Lunacy of Killing The Retarded, Ariz. Republic, Feb. 1,
2001, B1; see also, Dennis Byrne, Commute Davis’ Death Sentence, Chi.
Sun-Times, May 14, 1995, at 33 (two jurors would not have supported
the death penalty for Girvies Davis if they had heard evidence during the
trial about his mental retardation and illness). As to juries, while quantification in actual cases is difficult, both anecdotal evidence and social
science studies point to mental retardation as among the strongest of
mitigators. See generally Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitiga-
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The emergence of this political consensus has few, if any,
parallels in the recent history of public attitudes toward crime
and punishment. It is the product of a broadly shared moral
consensus.
II. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE OPPOSE THE EXECUTION OF INDIVIDUALS WITH MENTAL RETARDATION BECAUSE THE PRACTICE OFFENDS OUR SHARED MORAL VALUES.
In reaching the conclusion that people with mental retardation should not be subjected to the death penalty, legislators, jurors, mental disability professionals, and ordinary citizens are making a moral judgment. That judgment, in turn,
reflects their understanding of the condition of people with
mental retardation, and their beliefs about how capital punishment should be implemented.
A. It Is Widely Recognized That The Culpability Of
Defendants With Mental Retardation Is Reduced
By The Effects Of Their Intellectual Disability.
Societal attitudes toward people with mental disabilities
are undergoing substantial transformation. It is increasingly
accepted that people with mental retardation can be productive, contributing citizens of their communities, and that their
integration into those communities should be a goal of governmental policies. Longstanding patterns of “historic mistreatment, indifference, and hostility,” Olmstead v. L.C. ex
rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 608 (1999) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment), are being confronted. But the hard realities of the limitations imposed by mental retardation, and
the incomplete success of our society’s attempts to provide
necessary supports to all people with that disability, remain.

tion in Capital Cases: What Do Jurors Think?, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1538
(1998).
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The recognition of those realities is the centerpiece of the
consensus involved in this case.
This Court, too, has recognized that all people with mental retardation “have a reduced ability to cope with and function in the everyday world.” Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985). As amici wrote in
Penry, “[t]his reduced ability is found in every dimension of
the individual’s functioning, including his language, communication, memory, attention, ability to control impulsivity,
moral development, self-concept, self-perception, suggestibility, knowledge of basic information, and general motivation.”30 While there are variations among people with mental
30

Brief Amici Curiae of American Association on Mental Retardation, et
al., Penry, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (No. 87-6177), and sources cited therein.
Clinical literature published since Penry has confirmed those conclusions.
See, e.g., AAMR, Mental Retardation: Definition, Classification, and
Systems of Supports (9th ed. 1992); Manual of Diagnosis and Professional Practice in Mental Retardation (John W. Jacobson & James A.
Mulick eds., 1996); Robert M. Hodapp, Jacob A. Burack, & Edward
Zigler, Developmental Approaches to Mental Retardation: A Short Introduction, in Handbook of Mental Retardation and Development 3 (Jacob
A. Burack, et al. eds., 1998); Katherine A. Loveland & Belgin TunaliKotoski, Development of Adaptive Behavior in Persons with Mental Retardation, in Handbook of Mental Retardation and Development 521 (Jacob A. Burack, et al. eds., 1998)(adaptive behavior); Thomas L. Whitman, Self-Regulation and Mental Retardation, 94 A.J.M.R. 347
(1990)(impulse control); Johnny L. Matson & Virginia E. Fee, Social
Skills Difficulties Among Persons with Mental Retardation, Handbook of
Mental Retardation 468 (Johnny Matson & James Mulick eds.,
1991)(same); L.W. Heal & C.L. Sigelman, Response Biases in Interviews
of Individuals with Limited Mental Ability, 39 Intell. Disability Research
331 (1995)(acquiescence); Edward Zigler & Robert M. Hodapp, Behavioral Functioning in Individuals with Mental Retardation, 42 Ann. Rev.
Psychol. 29, 43 (1991)(outer-directedness); Harvey N. Switzky, Mental
Retardation and the Neglected Construct of Motivation, 32 Educ. and
Training in Mental Retardation and Developmental Disability 194
(1997)(extrinsic versus intrinsic motivation and relationship to social
deprivation); Josephine C. Jenkinson, Factors Affecting Decision-Making
by Young Adults with Intellectual Disabilities, 104 A.J.M.R. 320
(1999)(learned helplessness); Judith Cockram, Robert Jackson & Rod
Underwood, People with an Intellectual and Developmental Disability

-34-

retardation, all share these basic disabilities from childhood
and throughout their lives.
Few legislators considering proposals on this topic had
immersed themselves in the details of the clinical literature
before making their decisions,31 nor had many voters whose
opinions were being reflected. But what they understood
both instinctively and from their life’s experiences pointed to
the same conclusion; the execution of an individual with
mental retardation is morally unacceptable.32
and the Criminal Justice System: The Family Perspective, 23 J. Intell. &
Developmental Disability 41 (1998)(propensity to hide disability); S.E.
Szivos & E. Griffiths, Group Processes Involved in Coming to Terms
with a Mentally Retarded Identity, 28 Mental Retardation 333
(1990)(same); The Criminal Justice System and Mental Retardation:
Defendants and Victims (Ronald W. Conley, Ruth Luckasson & George
N. Bouthilet eds., 1992); James R. Dudley, Confronting the Stigma in
Their Lives: Helping People With A Mental Retardation Label (1997).
31

As is typical in the legislative process, sponsors of bills are the ones
who most fully immerse themselves in the subject matter, while members
of the committees of referral (most frequently Judiciary or Criminal Justice committees) heard testimony, including expert testimony from mental disability professionals. Legislators who did not serve on those committees relied on committee members and often asked them questions,
most frequently regarding the definition of mental retardation, in floor
debate.
32

This inescapable conclusion is evidenced by the following small sample of statements by governmental officials and editorial writers:
•

“[Georgia] Sen. Harrill L. Dawkins (D-Conyers), a supporter of
the legislation, called it ‘historically brutal’ to execute the mentally retarded, …” A.L. May, Proposal to Ban Death Sentences
for Retarded Fails, Atlanta Journal & Const., Feb. 2, 1988, at
A14.

•

“The Georgia Attorney General, Michael Bowers, who opposed
an earlier version of the legislation, said the final product was
‘progressive and a step forward in explicitly recognizing we are
not going to impose the death penalty on persons who are men-
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tally retarded.’…The Fulton County District Attorney, Lewis
Slaton, said his concern during the debate over the law was not
about banning the execution of mentally retarded people. ‘What
we’ve always been concerned about is that we are leery of
changing the law because it means that every person on death
row can now raise another ground,’ he said.” Associated Press,
Georgia to Bar Executions of Retarded Killers, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 12, 1988, at A26.
•

“State Sen. Howard A. Denis (R-Montgomery) said that there is
now a retarded inmate on Maryland’s death row and there have
been cases of retarded people being put to death. It is ‘barbaric’
and ‘uncivilized,’ Denis said.” Jo-Ann Armao, Md. Panel Revives Death Penalty Bill; Measure Would Bar the Retarded
From State’s Gas Chamber, Wash. Post, Mar. 4, 1989, at B3.

•

“‘I think people are willing to examine the ethical considerations
of executing mentally retarded people,’ said [Illinois State
Senator John] Cullerton. ‘I think taking the ultimate punishment
when someone is mentally retarded is just not right. Or necessary.’” Ken Armstrong and Steve Mills, Death Penalty in State
Faces New Challenge; Ban Urged for Mentally Retarded Defendants, Chi. Trib., Feb. 6, 2000, at News 1.

•

“‘I am an ardent supporter of capital punishment,’ said [Nevada
Assembly Speaker Richard] Perkins, the deputy chief of the
Henderson Police Department. ‘This is not an anti-death penalty
bill. It is a procedure for the death penalty when it is appropriate.’ Perkins added he has met with many families of murder
victims and none of them wants to go forward with the death
penalty against a mentally retarded person….The bill was introduced by Assemblywoman Sheila Leslie, D-Reno, who questioned the morality and ethics of executing mentally retarded
people.” Ed Vogel, Capital Punishment: Bill to Protect Mentally Retarded Passes, Las Vegas Review-Journal, Apr. 25,
2001, at B4.

•

“By passing legislation to ban the execution of the mentally retarded, the Texas Legislature proved that there can be compassionate justice…. If the defendant is found to be mentally retarded by either the jury or the judge, life imprisonment is the
maximum penalty. This is a strong, morally responsible plan
that the overwhelming majority of Texans support. Since the
death penalty was ruled constitutionally permissible in 1976, 35
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offenders with mental retardation have been executed nationwide. Texas leads the way, having executed six. Around the
globe this makes Texas look barbaric and concerned with revenge, not justice.” Texas State Senator Rodney Ellis, The HardLine Punishment Texans Don’t Support, N.Y. Times, June 2,
2001, at A13.
•

“And [Virginia] Del. Frank Hargrove, R-Hanover, who heads
the Joint Republican Caucus, has submitted a bill to abolish
capital punishment. Hargrove, a lawmaker since 1982, says he
is a longtime supporter of the death penalty but ‘I’ve never
really been satisfied I was doing the right thing.’ He says he has
now decided that the risk of executing an innocent man is too
great, and that life without parole is sufficient punishment for
even the most heinous crimes. The [Earl] Washington case, he
says, ‘points up the possibility of awful mistakes.’” Bill
Sizemore, Fixing the Flaws; Virginia Came So Close to Executing an Innocent Man, Virginian-Pilot, Jan. 23, 2001, at A1.

•

“Almost every Georgian understands that it is wrong to kill people who may not be fully responsible for their actions.” Editorial, Executing the Retarded Still Wrong, Atlanta Journal &
Const., Feb. 6, 1988, at A16.

•

“Yet even Texans who strongly support the death penalty must
see the moral offense in killing the retarded.” Editorial, Texas
Should Reform Services, Sentences for Mentally Retarded, Dallas Morning News, Nov. 15, 2000, at 4J.

•

“Executing those who are mentally retarded—even if they have
committed horrendous murders—strikes many people, ourselves
included, as repugnant, as an act of purposeless inhumanity.”
Editorial, Don’t Execute the Retarded, Rocky Mountain News,
Mar. 28, 2001, at 40A.

•

“The state legislatures that condone these executions ought to
take a second look, too. Even if the practice can pass as constitutional, it raises serious questions about the kind of society we
are and should aim to be.” Editorial, Killing the Retarded,
Commercial Appeal (Memphis, Tenn.), Mar. 28, 2001, at A8.

•

“Executing the mentally retarded is an act of unalloyed barbarism, totally devoid of human compassion.” Editorial, Executing
Retarded Is Cruel, Denver Post, Apr. 1, 2001, at G4.
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Part of this understanding is that mental retardation is a
substantial disability for every individual who has it. This
disability circumscribes intellectual functioning and learning
in ways that directly limit culpability. Legislators understood, or came to understand, that no one claimed that mental
retardation categorically meant that the defendant was entitled to acquittal on the basis of his disability.33 But since the
death penalty is reserved for the most culpable individuals,
the limitations imposed by the disability are, as this Court
found in Penry, quintessentially mitigating.34

33

“‘The bottom line is, if you believe people who are mentally retarded
should be punished, but shouldn’t get the death penalty, you’ll vote for
this bill,’ said [Colorado Rep. Shirleen Tucker (R-Lakewood)].” Steve
Lipsher, House OKs Ban on Execution of Mentally Retarded Murderers,
Denver Post, April 6, 1993, at 4B; “‘It doesn’t mean you are going to get
out free. You are going to be locked up for life,’ [Texas House sponsor
Rep. Juan Hinojosa] said.” Nation in Brief, Wash. Post, May 24, 2001, at
A09; “Execution of these pitiful souls does nothing for society that life
imprisonment could not accomplish.” Not a Reason to Execute, Denv.
Post, Aug. 8, 2000, at B8.
34

“Rep. Mike Wilson, D-Rapid City, said it makes no sense to execute
mentally retarded people because they are incapable of the premeditated
intent, cold-blooded ruthlessness and depravity that justify the death penalty. ‘Let’s make sure the punishment fits the criminal.’” Chet Brokaw,
House Committee Endorses Ban on Executing Mentally Retarded, Press
& Dakotan on the Web (Yankton, S.D.), Feb. 1, 2000, at ¶ 4 (internet
edition); Florida legislator Richard Mitchell remarked, “‘I am not saying
that they are not responsible for their actions. It’s just that they don’t
have that level of understanding’ that is necessary for the death penalty to
either avenge a crime or serve as a deterrent.” Don’t Execute the Retarded, The Ledger (Lakeland, Fla.), Mar. 30, 2001, at A16; “‘You don’t
execute people who don’t know what they are doing,’ said Rep. Gloria
Tanner, D-Denver.” Steve Lipsher, House OKs Ban on Execution of
Mentally Retarded Murderers, Denver Post, Apr. 6, 1993, at 4B; “[T]he
ultimate penalty can hardly be called justice when it is inflicted on someone who is no more able to understand his actions and control his behavior than a young child.” Stephen Chapman, The Moral Equivalent of
Executing Children, Chi. Trib., Jan. 14, 1996, at C19; “[T]he ultimate
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B. It Is Widely Recognized That The Disability Of
Mental Retardation Is Not A Condition That Is, In
Any Sense, The Defendant’s Fault, Or Something
For Which He Is Responsible.
Some conditions may appropriately be considered as
mitigating evidence in capital trials even though they involve
some voluntary act by the defendant. For example, intoxication at the time of the offense or drug addiction may reduce
culpability despite the fact that they involved defendant’s
own choice. By contrast, mental retardation is never the result of an individual’s voluntary choice, and thus is a condition for which he does not bear personal responsibility.35
penalty should be reserved for those who can comprehend why they are
going to die.” Questionable Execution, Fort Worth Star-Telegram, Nov.
16, 2000, at Metro 10. See also Gene R. Nichol, There’s No Case for
Executing the Retarded, News and Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 25,
2001, at A29

35

In Penry, the Court noted that some individuals with mental retardation
have had access to extraordinary special education and habilitation.
Penry, 492 U.S. at 338. In the experience of amici, that does not describe
any of the individuals who have been tried on capital charges. The fact
that these are individuals whom the system has failed, and in a sense we
as a society have failed, is not their fault either. See, e.g., Letters from the
People, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 17, 1993, at 7B. One of the facts
common to people with mental retardation is that they are, particularly in
the developmental period, more dependent on others, and especially
schools and other public and private agencies, for the achievement of
their full abilities. Likewise, whether an individual child receives that
assistance is not a matter of the individual’s choice. See Jim Yardly,
Bush to Decide on Stay of an Inmate’s Execution, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17,
1999 at A10 (quoting a lead editorial in the Dallas Morning News). Additionally, the clinical literature indicates that there is a vastly higher incidence of violent abuse against persons with developmental disabilities
than against nondisabled individuals. Harvey Wallace, Family Violence:
Legal, Medical, and Social Perspectives (2d ed. 1999); D. Aiello and L.
Capkin, Services for Disabled Victims: Elements and Standards, 7 Response to Violence in the Family and Sexual Assault 14 (1984). Where,
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Just as jurors tend to be most sympathetic to mitigation
claims that involve conditions beyond an individual’s control, Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in
Capital Cases: What Do Jurors Think?, 98 Colum. L. Rev.
1538, 1565 (1998), so too legislators took note of the fact
that mental retardation is not a chosen condition.36
C. It Has Come To Be Recognized, Particularly In
Recent Years, That A Defendant’s Mental Retardation Greatly Increases The Likelihood Of The
Conviction And Execution Of A Factually Innocent Individual, And That This Risk Is Intolerable.
The potential for convicting and even executing an individual with mental retardation who was innocent of the crime
was part of the discussion of proposed legislation, dating
back to the earliest enactment in the late 1980s.37 But in recent years, this chilling possibility has received renewed attention with the discovery that a number of defendants with
mental retardation who had faced capital charges, and in
some cases had been sent to Death Row, were incontrovertibly innocent. Although the facts of these cases are relatively
as is true in essentially all the decided cases, an individual’s mental retardation is exacerbated by being born and raised in conditions of poverty,
the deck is further stacked against the person. See, e.g. Dan Baum, Lawyers Argue for Bowden’s Life Before Parole Board, Atlanta Const., June
17, 1986, at 5A.; see also, Penry, 492 U.S. at 309. Again, this does not
mean that people with mental retardation cannot be held accountable for
their actions, including criminal accountability. But when conditions that
led to the crime are “not exclusively the offender’s fault,” Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 n.11 (1982), death becomes an inappropriate penalty.
36
See, e.g., Ed Vogel, Capital Punishment: Bill to Protect Mentally Retarded Passes, Las-Vegas Review Journal, Apr. 25, 2001, at B4.
37

Editorial, Humanity Wins in Georgia, St. Petersburg Times, Apr. 18,
1988, at 10A; Jennifer Gavin, Death-Penalty Ban For Retarded OK’d,
Denver Post, Feb. 18, 1993, at 5B; Editorial, Letters From The People,
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 17, 1993, at 7B.
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familiar, amici would call the Court’s attention to two of
them.
Earl Washington, a man with mental retardation, was
sentenced to death in Virginia for murder on the basis of a
false confession. After being incarcerated for 18 years (and
coming within days of execution), Washington was later
proven by DNA evidence to be innocent of the crime, and
was ultimately released.38
Anthony Porter, another man with mental retardation,
was convicted and sentenced to death in Illinois. Within
days of his scheduled execution, Porter was granted a stay of
execution by the Illinois Supreme Court to allow time to explore whether he was competent to be executed, see generally Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), and whether
the execution of a person with mental retardation violated the
Illinois state constitution. A few weeks later, while that stay
of execution was in effect, journalism students at Northwestern University conclusively demonstrated that Porter had not
committed the crime, and he was released from custody.39

38

Bill Miller and Steve Bates, DNA Test Could Lead To Man’s Release;
Death Row Inmate May Be Innocent of ’82 Murder, VA. Officials Say,
Wash. Post, Oct. 26, 1993, at A1; Peter Baker, Death-Row Inmate Gets
Clemency; Agreement Ends Day of Suspense, Wash. Post, Jan. 15, 1994,
at A1; Francis X. Clines, New DNA Tests Are Seen As Key To Virginia
Case, N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 2000, at A18.
39
Christi Parsons, Court Stalls Execution, Asks If Killer Is Smart
Enough To Die, Chi. Trib., Sept. 22, 1998, at N1; Pam Belluck, Class Of
Slueths To Rescue On Death Row; Journalism Students Track Down Suspect After Re-enacting Killing, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1999, at A14; Mark
LeBien and Charlie Meyerson, Porter Freed From Prison, Chi. Trib.,
Feb. 5, 1999, at C1; Douglas Holt and Flynn McRoberts, Porter Fully
Savors First Taste Of Freedom; Judge Releases Man Once Set For Execution, Chi. Trib., Feb. 6, 1999, at N1.
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Cases like Washington’s and Porter’s, in addition to others,40 became part of the public debate about whether people
with mental retardation should be subject to the death penalty, and increased support for state legislation.41
These notorious cases have focused national attention on
the plight of individuals with mental retardation who may
face capital punishment. The potential for such a Kafkaesque
miscarriage of justice has accentuated the moral consensus
already in place, and heightened the sense of urgency about
enacting protective legislation. As a society, we have become
painfully aware of the situation facing all capital defendants
with mental retardation; their intellectual limitations create
inherent vulnerability. Americans fully understand the impact of an individual’s mental retardation on the level of his
culpability. As the reality of this problem has become clearer
in the Nation’s consciousness, our sense of moral repugnance
has produced a renewed commitment to oppose the execution
of any individual with mental retardation.

40

Other innocent individuals with mental retardation were imprisoned
following guilty pleas entered to avoid the death penalty. The most notable example was Johnny Lee Wilson, a man with mental retardation, who
was sentenced to life in prison following a confession and guilty plea.
Terry Ganey, Pardoned Man Wants ‘To Pick Up My Life,’ St. Louis PostDispatch, Sept. 30, 1995, at 1A; Editorial, Johnny Lee Wilson, Free At
Last, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Oct. 1, 1995, at 2B. In pardoning Wilson,
Governor Carnahan conceded “we have locked up an innocent, retarded
man who is not guilty of the crime of which he is accused” and he concluded, “It’s really pretty unbelievable that this case could get through
the court system.” Robert P. Sigman, Revisiting Johnny Lee Wilson, Kansas City Star, Sept. 15, 1996, at K2.
41
Cornelia Grumman and Christi Parsons, Pressure To Review Death
Penalty Grows, Chi. Trib., Feb. 7, 1999 (internet edition); Editorial, Suspend Death Penalty, Kansas City Star, Apr. 29, 2000, at B6; Editorial,
Don’t Execute The Mentally Retarded, Chi. Trib., Aug. 10, 2000, at N22;
Editorial, Judgment Call In Death Penalty; Even Supporters Of Capital
Punishment Can Create An Exception For People Who Are Mentally Retarded, Oregonian, Aug. 9, 2000, at B10.
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CONCLUSION
For these reasons, amici respectfully urge reversal of
the judgment of the Supreme Court of North Carolina.
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